An Atlanticist Grand Strategy for Hungary: What Could It Look Like?
For decades, Hungarian foreign policy has swung between two seemingly incompatible poles: passive conformity to Western – especially EU – expectations, typically associated with the left of the Hungarian political spectrum, and an assertive emphasis on national sovereignty, often in opposition to the same alliances, more characteristic of the right. But must these two directions be mutually exclusive? I argue that this is a false dichotomy. It is possible to envision a grand strategy that combines firm alliance loyalty with assertive advocacy for national interests. An essay by Csaba Barnabas Horvath.
This article begins with Hungary’s immediate geopolitical environment – its neighborhood and the fragile regional balance – and gradually expands outward to examine Central European cooperation, broader European power dynamics, and eventually Asia’s strategic significance. Throughout, I outline how an Atlanticist, yet sovereignty-conscious grand strategy could serve Hungary’s long-term interests.
A difficult neighborhood
Given the sizable ethnic Hungarian minority in both Romania and Slovakia – a legacy of historical border changes – periodic diplomatic tensions between Hungary and these two neighbors are almost inevitable. In Romania, ethnic Hungarians make up roughly 6% of the population, with a majority presence in 2 out of the country’s 41 counties and over 20% presence in four additional ones. In Slovakia, Hungarians represent close to one tenth of the country’s entire population, with 2 out of the country’s 8 regions registering over 20%. This is not a diaspora issue; it is a geopolitically relevant, territorially anchored minority presence that remains central to identity politics and nation-building narratives in both countries.
These structural tensions are compounded by the fact that both political systems have historically often resisted minority rights as defined by Western European standards – and occasionally see the rise of explicitly anti-Hungarian nationalist parties. This alone renders Hungary’s geopolitical position vulnerable in the region.
In such an environment, it becomes vital for Hungary to cultivate a special strategic relationship with the United States, and to maintain close partnership with the region’s most influential middle power, Poland. These alliances can serve as strategic guarantees in the face of potential nationalist backlashes in Romanian or Slovak politics.
In this context, a reconciliation with Ukraine becomes not just desirable but necessary,
for two reasons. First, strengthening Hungary’s relationship with the United States is inseparable from rebuilding its partnership with Poland, which sees Ukraine as a vital strategic ally. The growing convergence between Ukraine and the U.S., including cooperation on rare earth supply chains under the Trump administration, further underscores this logic.
Second, Hungary’s strategic room to maneuver would shrink significantly if Ukraine were to align itself with the Romanian–Slovak axis that frequently positions itself in opposition to Hungarian interests. Such a hostile regional configuration would likely make both the United States and Poland more reluctant to support Hungary in future disputes.
Encouragingly, in December 2023, Ukraine passed a legal amendment granting broad exemptions from restrictive language laws to the schools of its own ethnic Hungarian minority, a small community compared to those in Romania or Slovakia, but still symbolically important. Moreover, tensions between Ukraine and Romanian nationalism – such as the banning of prominent nationalist figures from Ukrainian territory – suggest that close alignment between the two is far from inevitable.
A well-crafted Hungarian–Ukrainian rapprochement could not only decouple Ukraine from Romania and Slovakia but also elevate it to the status of a strategic partner in containing nationalist extremism in the region. A Polish–Hungarian–Ukrainian triangle would incentivize both Warsaw and Washington to adopt at least a stance of benevolent neutrality toward Hungary, even if tensions reemerge with Romania or Slovakia in the future.
Can the CEE Region Become an Independent Geopolitical Actor?
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are too small to act as significant geopolitcal actors individually. This has led to recurring efforts to build regional blocs — from the Visegrád Group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) to the more recent Bucharest Nine (B9), which adds the Baltic states, Romania, and Bulgaria. While other regional formats exist — such as the Three Seas Initiative — the Bucharest Nine has emerged as the more active and security-focused grouping since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Unlike the TSI, the B9 includes only NATO member states, excluding neutral countries like Austria, and has aligned more closely with U.S. defense interests in recent years.
The rationale behind such coalitions is clear. Frustrations with the Franco-German axis that dominates EU decision-making are widespread across the region, where local concerns are often perceived as overlooked or misunderstood by Brussels. A regionally cohesive CEE bloc would be
in a better position to balance this asymmetry and demand meaningful inclusion in European strategic planning.
This vision also aligns with longstanding U.S. support for Atlanticist, sovereignty-oriented regional structures — particularly under Polish leadership — as a counterweight not only to Russian aggression, but at times also to centralized EU federalism. If Hungary envisions a role within a sovereign Central European strategic pole, aligning with this trend would be the most viable path forward.
From this perspective, Ukraine’s role — and the broader goal of containing Russian expansionism — becomes doubly significant. Not only is Ukraine a strategic partner for both the U.S. and Poland, but a Polish–Hungarian–Ukrainian axis would offer additional security guarantees for Hungary against the risk of resurgent nationalism in Romania or Slovakia. Just as importantly, the inclusion or exclusion of Ukraine may well determine the critical mass of such a bloc.
The numbers illustrate the stakes clearly. The combined population of the B9 countries stands at around 95 million. On the other side, the Russian nationalist vision of a restored post-Soviet space — originally outlined by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and still influential in Kremlin-aligned thinking — includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, totaling roughly 212 million. If Moscow succeeded in pulling Ukraine and Kazakhstan under firm control, this would yield an overwhelming demographic and strategic advantage over any Central European coalition.
By contrast, if Ukraine joined the Central European side, the bloc’s population would rise to about 133 million, while the population of Russia on its own is about 143 million. Given that per capita GDP in the region is comparable to that of Russia, this would place the alliance within a similar weight class, especially under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella. In this scenario, Hungary would gain not only protection, but increased room for sovereign maneuver within Europe.
In short, whether Ukraine ultimately integrates into Russia’s sphere of influence or joins a sovereign Central European bloc will likely determine whether the region can act as an autonomous player, or whether reliance on Brussels remains its only viable option to resist Russian domination.
The Emerging Northern–Central European Axis
Since the early 2020s, a new strategic configuration has been gradually taking shape across Europe: a loosely aligned axis connecting the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries, and Central and Eastern Europe. Though still informal, this emerging bloc increasingly serves as a counterbalance to the Franco-German core that continues to dominate decision-making in Brussels. If Hungary were to pursue the kind of Atlanticist-yet-sovereignty-conscious grand strategy outlined in this paper, it would naturally find itself aligned with this broader Northern-Central European framework.
This leads to a key strategic question: Should Hungary seek to reduce its dependence on the Franco-German core through closer ties with the United States, at a time when “strategic autonomy” from the U.S. is once again being discussed within the EU? The answer may hinge on the form such autonomy would take. If greater EU independence from Washington merely results in deeper dependence on the Brussels institutions – and thus on Paris and Berlin – then for smaller states like Hungary,
the American partnership could actually offer more room for maneuver.
For the Franco-German core, strategic autonomy from the United States is a natural goal: it would only amplify their leadership within Europe. But for countries on the EU’s eastern flank – whose geopolitical leverage inside the Union is more limited – the key question becomes not who leads Europe, but how much flexibility smaller member states retain within any strategic framework. From this perspective, anchoring themselves more closely to transatlantic structures, including U.S. and U.K. partnerships, may offer a more favorable balance of power.
This logic does not imply rejecting European integration. The countries aligned along the Northern–Central axis could remain firmly within the EU’s economic architecture. But it points toward a vision of a “multi-speed Europe,” in which some member states – including those in Central and Eastern Europe – form a looser, more sovereignty-oriented outer circle. Crucially, this looser alignment would still remain within the Western alliance system, but with greater autonomy from Brussels and its dominant capitals. In this way, strengthening ties with the United States may allow countries like Hungary to mitigate overdependence on the centralized EU core without stepping outside the transatlantic fold.
Rethinking Asia
An Atlanticist grand strategy for Hungary would not preclude strong relations with Asian countries. On the contrary, it would require a realignment of priorities within Asia, emphasizing engagement with those states that are themselves aligned with the United States, or at least maintain a neutral and cooperative posture toward Washington.
Many of Asia’s leading powers today are partners of the United States, particularly in efforts to counterbalance the rise of China or contain regional threats like Iran. The backbone of this alignment is the “Quad,” a strategic partnership established in 2017 between the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. Additional key indicators of alignment include participation in past and present U.S.-backed initiatives, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) – which includes India, Japan, South Korea, and most major Southeast Asian economies – and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a newer initiative linking India with Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Unlike economic ties with China, Russia, or Iran,
partnerships with these countries would not conflict with an Atlanticist foreign policy.
In fact, they would likely be supported – even welcomed – by Washington, especially if they serve to strengthen regional stability and reduce strategic dependencies on authoritarian powers.
The potential here is not only theoretical. Poland’s recent defense partnership with South Korea – under which Polish industry is licensed to produce advanced K2 main battle tanks – demonstrates how cooperation with pro-Western Asian partners can deliver tangible high-tech, defense-industrial, and economic benefits for Central European countries.
In this broader view, a pro-Western, yet assertive foreign policy would not limit Hungary’s global reach. Rather, it opens up new avenues of partnership – including in Asia – that are fully compatible with transatlantic alignment and may even expand Hungary’s strategic room for maneuver within that framework.
Energy Diversification Beyond Russia
Any realistic grand strategy must also address the question of energy security, especially in a region like Central Europe, which has long depended heavily on Russian natural gas. Yet in recent years, several pipeline-based alternatives have begun to emerge, and within a few years these could substantially reduce or even end Central Europe’s energy dependence on Moscow. Three major opportunities are worth highlighting: Qatar, Ukraine, and the Azerbaijan–Turkmenistan corridor.
In April 2025, Turkey and Syria’s new government signed a memorandum of understanding to revive plans for a pipeline carrying Qatari natural gas to Europe via Syria, a project previously blocked for over a decade by Bashar al-Assad’s Russian-backed regime. Analysts have long argued that the original cancellation was a geopolitical concession to Moscow, which sought to protect its dominant gas market share in Europe.
Qatar possesses gas reserves that amount to roughly half of Russia’s, and if delivered by pipeline (rather than via liquefied natural gas, or LNG, shipments by sea), Qatari gas could become cost-competitive with Russian supplies. A functioning pipeline from the Gulf through Syria anf Turkey into Southern or Central Europe would therefore represent a transformative development in the region’s energy landscape, and would align with the strategic priorities of NATO’s southern flank.
Ukraine, too, offers substantial – and often overlooked – gas reserves. With extractable reserves exceeding two-thirds of Norway’s and more than double those of Romania, Ukraine ranks as Europe’s second-largest potential gas producer. Crucially, the vast majority of these reserves lie in territory currently under Ukrainian government control. Even if the war were to end with a ceasefire along existing frontlines, Ukraine could still become a major exporter, especially since much of the necessary infrastructure already exists. Production, not transportation, is the main bottleneck.
This adds another layer of strategic rationale to a Hungarian–Ukrainian rapprochement. Beyond shared security interests, energy cooperation could serve both countries’ national interests,
and offers Europe a much-needed domestic alternative to Russian gas.
A third promising source is Azerbaijan, from which Hungary has already begun importing gas through existing pipelines. But this relationship remains underdeveloped, and could be significantly expanded if plans for the long-envisioned Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline are realized. This would connect Azerbaijan’s pipeline network with neighboring Turkmenistan, whose gas reserves are even larger than Azerbaijan’s. The main obstacle so far has been Russian opposition, often expressed in the language of environmental concerns. But if Moscow’s geopolitical position weakens, the project may finally proceed.
Each of these sources – Qatar, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan–Turkmenistan – represents a realistic, pipeline-based alternative to Russian gas. While Russia may remain a supplier in the long term, the goal is clear: to make Moscow one of four major suppliers, not the sole one. Such diversification would not only reduce vulnerability to political pressure, but also give Hungary and its neighbors more leverage and flexibility, within the broader transatlantic alliance.
A Missed Window: Strategic Leverage and Minority Rights
Among the most sensitive and enduring challenges for Hungarian foreign policy has been the question of ethnic Hungarian minorities in neighboring states – an issue that has, at times, complicated Hungary’s position within Western alliances. Yet even in this context, a more consistent, alliance-oriented foreign policy could have opened diplomatic pathways that might otherwise remain closed. Had Hungary pursued such a consistently Atlanticist approach over the past several years – including early and unambiguous support for Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession – it might have gained enough diplomatic goodwill to raise strategic national priorities of its own. Among these, one sensitive but legitimate issue could have been the situation of the ethnic Hungarian minority in Romania, which – as mentioned earlier – forms a territorially concentrated community comprising over 6% of the country’s population. In two of Romania’s 41 counties, Hungarians make up more than 50% of the population, and in four others, over 20%.
In recent years, Romania’s long-delayed accession to the Schengen Area has represented one of the few points of leverage available to Hungary within the EU framework – a symbolic and practical issue with limited transatlantic ramifications, but high regional significance.
While any linkage between minority rights and Romania’s Schengen accession would have required careful diplomacy, it is worth noting that the issue has never held the same level of strategic urgency for the United States or NATO as did Nordic enlargement. Furthermore, several Western EU member states themselves had previously withheld support for Romania and Bulgaria’s entry over rule-of-law concerns.
In this context – and within the framework of alliance solidarity – Budapest
might have been able to encourage a more open dialogue around minority rights,
including the possibility of a Western European–style autonomy arrangement for Szeklerland, the majority-ethnic Hungarian region of Romania, modeled on examples such as South Tyrol.
Success would not have been guaranteed, and diplomatic friction would have been inevitable. But if this issue truly represents a strategic priority for Hungary, it is worth acknowledging that the window for raising it — from a position of transatlantic credibility — have already likely closed, perhaps for a long time.
Cover picture: Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky shakes hands with Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban after delivering a press conference in Kyiv on July 2, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Genya SAVILOV / AFP)
